Unit 9A - Globalization's Dual Power
Globalization's Dual Power
Robert J. Samuelson
At the edge of a new century, globalization is a double-edged sword: a powerful vehicle that raises economic growth, spreads new technology and raises living standards in rich and poor countries alike; but also an immensely controversial process that assaults national sovereignty, erodes local culture and tradition and threatens economic and social instability.
A daunting question of the 21st century is whether nations will control this great upheaval or whether it will come to control them.
In some respects globalization is merely a trendy word for an old process. What we call the market is simply the joining of buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, and savers and investors. Economic history consists largely of the story of the market's expansion: from farm to town, from region to nation and from nation to nation. In the 20th century, the Depression and two world wars retarded the market's growth. But after World War II ended, it re-accelerated, driven by political pressures and better technology.
The Cold War, from the late 1940s through the 1980s, caused the United States to champion trade liberalization and economic growth as a way of combating communism. A succession of major trade negotiations reduced average tariffs in industrialized countries to about 5 percent in 1990 from about 40 percent in 1946.
After two world wars, Europeans saw economic unification as an antidote to deadly nationalism. Technology complemented politics. Ever, before the Internet, declining costs for communication and transportation—from jet planes, better undersea telephone cables and satellites—favored more global commerce. By the early 1990s, world exports (after adjusting for inflation) were nearly 10 times higher than they had been four decades earlier.
Globalization continues this process but also departs from it in at least one critical respect. Until recently, countries were viewed as distinct economic entities, connected mainly by trade. Now, this is becoming less true. Companies and financial markets increasingly disregard national borders when making production, marketing and investment decisions.
As recently as 1990, governments—either individually or through such multilateral institutions as the World Bank—provided half the loans and credits to 29 major developing countries (including Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Mexico), according to the Institute of International Finance, a banking industry research group in Washington.
A decade later, even after Asia's 1997-1998 financial crisis, private capital flows dwarf governmental flows.
In 1999, private flows (bank loans, bond financing, equity investment in local stock markets and direct investment by multinational companies) totaled an estimated $136 billion to these 29 countries, compared with government capital flow of $22 billion, according to the institute.
Meanwhile, multinational companies have gone on an international acquisition binge. In the first half of 1999 alone, the value of new cross-border mergers and acquisitions passed $500 billion in both advanced and developing countries.
The total roughly matched the amount for all 1998 ($544 billion) and was almost seven times larger than the 1991 level ($85 billion), according to the World Investment Report by the United Nations. The recent takeover struggle between British and German wireless giants-Vodafone AirTouch PLC and Mannesmann AG—is exceptional only for its size and bitterness.
Behind the merger boom lies the growing corporate conviction that many markets have become truly global. By trying to maximize their presence in as many nations as possible, companies seek to achieve economies of scale—that is, to lower costs through higher sales and production volumes—and to stay abreast of technological changes that can now occur almost anywhere.
In addition, companies increasingly organize production globally, dividing product design, component manufacturing and final assembly among many countries.
But it is not just multinational companies, seeking bigger sales and profits that drive globalization. Governments do, too. In Europe, the relentless pursuit of the "single market" is one indicator. This reflects a widespread recognition that European companies will be hard-pressed to compete in global markets if their local operations are hamstrung by fragmented national markets.
Among poorer countries, the best sign of support is the clamor to get into the World Trade Organization. Since 1995, seven countries—Bulgaria, Ecuador, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Mongolia and Panama—have joined. And 32 are seeking membership. There is a belief that global trade and investment can aid economic development by providing new products, technologies and management skills.
It's no myth. Countries succeed or fail mainly based on their own workers, investment and government policies. But engaging the wider world economy can help.
Consider Asia. Despite its financial crisis, rapid trade expansion and economic growth sharply cut the number of the desperately poor. From 1987 to 1998, those in the region, including China, with incomes of $1 or less a day dropped to 15 percent from 27 percent of the population, the World Bank estimates.
Meanwhile, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa—whose embrace of the world economy has been late or limited—fared much less well. In Africa, for example, the World Bank reckons that 46 percent of the population lived on less than $1 a day in 1998, exactly what the percentage was in 1987.
Well, if globalization is so good, why is it also so risky? The answer is that two problems could neutralize its potential benefits.
The first is economic instability. The global economy may be prone to harsher boom-bust cycles than national economies individually. The theory that international trade and investment raise living standards works only if investment funds are well used and if trade flows do not become too lopsided.
The Asian financial crisis raised questions on both counts. In the early 1990s, most of Asia thrived because it received vast flows of foreign capital as bank loans, direct investment in factories or stock-market investment in local companies.
The ensuing spending boom in turn aided Europe, Japan and the United States by increasing imports from them. Then the boom abruptly halted in mid-1997 when, it became apparent that as a result of "crony capitalism," inept government investment policies and excess optimism, much of the investment had been wasted on unneeded factories, office buildings and apartments.
What prevented the Asian crisis from becoming a full-scale global economic downturn has been the astonishing US economy.
Its relentless growth helped the rest of the world by purchasing more and more of their exports. Since 1996, the US current-account deficit in its balance of payments—the broadest measure of the country's international trade—has more than doubled, from $129 billion to an estimated total of $330 billion in 1999.
The world economy, as Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has repeatedly said, has been flying on one engine. The trouble is, as Mr. Summers has also warned, this cannot go on forever.
The great danger is that the world has become too dependent on American prosperity and that a slowdown or recession—reflecting a decline in the stock market, a loss of consumer confidence or higher interest rates—might snowball into an international slump.
By economic forecasts, Europe and Japan are going to do better. In 2000, the European Union's gross domestic product will grow 2.8 percent, up from 2.1 percent in 1999, according to projections by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. Japan is projected to grow 1.4 percent, the same as the OECD is predicting for 1999 but a big improvement from the 2.8 percent drop in 1998.
If the forecasts materialize—and the OECD's growth estimates for Japan exceed most private forecasts—they will restore some balance to the world economy and relieve fears of a global recession.
Asia and Latin America can continue to recover without relying solely on exports to the United States. But until that happens, no one can be certain that Asia's financial crisis has truly ended. It remains possible that abrupt surges of global capital, first moving into Asia and then out, will have caused, with some delay, a larger instability.
Globalization's other problem is political, cultural and social. People feel threatened by any kind of economic change—and change from abroad naturally seems especially alien and menacing.
The street protesters at the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization in early December may have lacked a common agenda or even a coherent case against trade. But they accurately reflected the anxiety and anger that globalization often inspires. So do European fears of genetically modified food or nationalistic opposition to cross-border mergers.
What is local and familiar is suddenly being replaced or, assaulted by something that is foreign and unfamiliar. And even if trade helps most people, it will usually create some losers. In the United States, workers in some high-cost industries-steel and autos, most conspicuously—suffered from intensified import competition.
Just because globalization is largely spontaneous propelled by better communications and transportation—does not mean that it is inevitable or completely irreversible. Governments can, in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, shield local industries and workers against imports or discriminate against foreign investors. If only a few countries do, their actions will not matter much. Global capital and trade will go where they are most welcome and productive. Indeed, it is precisely this logic that has persuaded so many countries to accept globalization. If they don't, someone else will. Judged by their behavior, most governments believe they have more to gain than to lose.
But this does not mean that a powerful popular backlash, with unpredictable consequences, is not possible. In a global recession, too many sellers will be chasing too few buyers. A plausible presumption is that practical politicians would try to protect their constituents from global gluts. If too many countries did, globalization could implode.
It's a scary prospect. Economic interdependence cuts both ways. Under favorable conditions, it helps everyone; under unfavorable conditions, it hurts everyone: Globalization's promise may exceed its peril—but the peril is still real. Both await the new century. One of the great dramas will be to see which prevails.
参考译文——全球化的双重力量
全球化的双重力量
罗伯特·J.塞缪尔森
在新世纪即将到来之际，全球化是一把双刃剑：它不仅仅是富国和穷国促进经济增长、传播新技术、提高生活水平的有力工具；同时它还是一个极具争议性的进程，它侵犯了国家主权，腐蚀了当地的文化传统，造成经济和社会的不稳定。
21世纪一个让人胆战心惊的问题是，各个国家能否控制这一剧变，抑或是被这一剧变控制。
从某种程度上来说，全球化只是一个时髦字眼而已，用来形容一种由来已久的过程。我们所说的市场只不过是买方和卖方、生产者和消费者、储蓄者和投资者的结合。经济史在很大程度上就是市场扩张的过程：从农场到城镇、从地区到国家、从一个国家到另一个国家。在20世纪，经济大萧条和两次世界大战阻碍了市场的发展。但是在二战结束后，受政治压力与更先进技术的推动作用，经济又得以加速发展。
从20世纪40年代后期到80年代，“冷战”促使美国极力捍卫贸易自由化和经济增长，并以此作为对抗共产主义的一种手段。一系列的重要贸易谈判使工业化国家的平均关税从1946年的约40%削减到1990年的5%左右。
两次世界大战之后，欧洲人把经济一体化看作对付沉闷的民族主义的一剂良药。技术与政治相辅相成。（在因特网发明之前，喷气式飞机、质量更好的海底通信电缆与人造卫星等技术使得通讯和交通成本持续下降，这有利于全球贸易的发展。到了20世纪90年代初期，全球出口量（去除价格上涨因素）几乎比40多年前高出了10倍。
全球化使这一经济进程持续着，但同时至少在一个关键方面发生了变化。直到不久前，国家一直被视为主要通过贸易来联结的独立经济实体。现在，情况已经不完全是这样了。各公司和金融市场在对生产、销售与投资进行决策时越来越不顾及国家间的界线了。
就在1990年，据位于华盛顿的一家银行业研究机构——国际金融研究所的统计，由政府——不管是各自单独行动，还是通过像世界银行这样的多边机构——向29个主要发展中国家（包括巴西、中国、印度、韩国与墨西哥）提供了占半数的贷款和信贷。
十年后，甚至在1997到1998年的亚洲金融危机之后，私人资金流量已使政府资金流量相形见绌。
据该研究机构的统计，在1999年进入这29个国家的私人资金流量（银行贷款、债券融资、在当地股票市场的证券投资以及跨国公司的直接投资）总额达到1，360亿美元，而政府的资金流量仅为220亿美元。
与此同时，跨国公司掀起国际收购狂潮。仅在1999年上半年，在发达国家与发展中国家中所进行的跨国兼并与收购的价值就超过了5，000亿美元。
据联合国发布的世界投资报告所说，这个数值与1998年全年的总额（5，440亿美元）相差无几，几乎是1991年（850亿美元）的7倍。最近英国沃达丰AirTouch上市公司和德国曼内斯曼公司两大无线电巨头之间围绕接管问题的争斗仅在激烈程度与规模方面就前所未有。
兼并热潮的背后是公司经营者愈来愈强的信念，他们相信许多市场已经真正全球化。公司通过努力在尽可能多的国家极力扩大势力，谋求发展规模经济一也就是说，通过扩大销售和生产规模来降低成本——并试图跟上如今几乎无处不在的技术变革步伐。
另外，公司越来越多地在世界范围内组织生产，把产品设计、零部件生产、最后的产品组装分散到许多国家进行。
不过，推动全球化的并不单单是追求更高销售额和利润的跨国公司，各国政府也起着促进的作用。在欧洲，不懈追求的“单一市场”就是一个信号。这反映了一种共识：如果欧洲公司在当地的运营受到支离破碎的国内市场的阻碍，那么它们将在参与全球市场的竞争中面临窘境。
对于一些较为贫穷的国家来说，支持全球化的最好信号就是强烈要求加入世界贸易组织。1995年以来，7个国家——保加利亚、厄瓜多尔、爱沙尼亚、吉尔吉斯斯坦、拉脱维亚、蒙古和巴拿马——已经加入了世贸组织。还有32个国家正在积极寻求加入。人们相信，通过提供新的产品、技术和管理方式，全球贸易和投资会有助于经济发展。
这不是什么天方夜谭。一个国家的成功与否，主要取决于本国的工人、投资与政府政策，但参与到更大范围的世界经济中会对本国经济有所帮助。
以亚洲为例，尽管遭受了金融危机，但快速的贸易扩张和经济增长大幅度削减了赤贫人口的数量。据世界银行估计，从1987到1998年间，包括中国在内的地区或国家中，日平均收入在1美元或不足1美元的人口从占总数的27%下降到15%。
与此同时，由于拉丁美洲和非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南的国家参与世界经济的时间较晚或范围有限，因此它们与亚洲国家相比，形势要严峻得多。例如，据世界银行估计，1998年非洲总人口的46%每天的生活费低于1美元，这个比例与1987年的完全相同。
那么，既然全球化有那么多的好处，为什么它也有巨大的风险呢？答案是：来自两方面的问题有可能中和全球化潜在的益处。
首先是经济的不稳定性。和独立的各国经济相比，全球性经济更容易受到经济高涨萧条周期的严峻影响。只有在投资资金得到很好运用、贸易流通平衡发展的情况下，国际贸易与投资能有效提高生活水平这一理论才能成立。
亚洲金融危机对这两个问题提出了质疑。在20世纪90年代初期，大部分亚洲国家经济一派欣欣向荣，是因为它们获得了大量外国资金，如它们以银行贷款、对工厂的直接投资、或对地方公司的股票市场投资等方式流入本国。
随之而来的消费狂潮带动了进口量的增长，这促使了欧洲、日本和美国的经济发展。接着这股消费潮在1997年中期突然停止。很显然，由于“裙带资本主义”、不当的政府投资政策以及过度的乐观情绪，大量投资被浪费在不必要的工厂、写字楼和公寓的建设上了。
正是由于美国经济的惊人增长，才阻止了亚洲金融危机演变成全球范围的经济衰退。
美国经济的持续增长使它能越来越多地购买其他国家的出口产品，这样也有助于这些国家的经济发展。从1996年起，美国国际收支往来账目赤字——这是衡量一个国家国际贸易最全面的指标——从1，290亿美元上升到1999年的大约3，300亿美元，翻了一番还多。
正如美国财政部部长劳伦斯·萨默斯多次强调的，世界经济是靠一个引擎在飞行。但同时萨默斯先生警告说，问题在于这种情况不能够永远持续下去。
巨大的危险在于世界太过于依赖美国经济的繁荣，所以一旦美国经济出现减速或衰退——反映在股市的下跌、消费者信心的丧失或利率较高等方面——就会像滚雪球般发展成为全球范围的经济衰退。
根据经济预测，欧洲和日本经济走势会更好。另据总部设在巴黎的经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的预测，2000年欧盟的国内生产总值将增长2.8%，而1999年增长了2.1%。日本的国内生产总值预计将增长1.4%，与经济合作与发展组织对1999年的预测一致，但相对于1998年2.8%的下滑而言已是一个很大的进步。
如果这些预测成为现实——经济合作与发展组织对日本经济增长的预测比大多数民间预测乐观一些——这将会给世界经济发展注入平衡，缓解人们对全球经济衰退产生的恐惧心理。
亚洲和拉丁美洲的经济可以不用完全依赖对美国的出口而持续恢复。但在它们的经济复苏之前，没有人能确定亚洲金融危机是否真的结束了。仍有可能出现全球资本的急剧流动，首先涌入亚洲，随后又涌出，这将会在一段时间之后造成更大规模的不稳定局面。
全球化所引发的另一个问题涉及政治、文化与社会方面。人们感到任何经济变革都会给他们带来威胁——而来自其他国家的变革自然而然看起来不仅令人感到特别陌生，而且具有威胁性。
12月初在西雅图举行的世贸组织会议期间，街头抗议者们可能没有反对贸易的共同计划，甚至没有统一的理由，但是他们准确地反映出了全球化经常会引发的焦虑与愤怒情绪。欧洲人对转基因食品的恐惧以及出于民族主义而对跨国兼并的反对也是这种情绪的反应。
当地常见的事物突然间被外来的陌生事物所取代，甚至遭到侵犯。尽管这种贸易会对多数人有帮助，但也会使一些人蒙受损失。在美国，从事某些高成本行业的工人——最为显著的是钢铁业和汽车业——在激烈的进口竞争中蒙受损失。
正是因为更完善的通信和交通设施，全球化在很大程度上得以自然而然地受到推动——但这不意味着全球化不可避免或不可逆转。政府可以用微妙的或不那么微妙的方式庇护地方工业和工人免受进口的冲击，或是排斥外国投资者。如果只是少数国家这样做，这种行为并不会带来多大的影响。全球资本和贸易会转向它们最受欢迎和最有产出的地方。的确，也正是这种逻辑说服了众多国家接受全球化。如果它们不接受，就会有别的国家接受。从其行为来看，大部分政府相信，他们获得的利益大于损失。
但是这并不意味着民众就不会对全球化表示强烈的反对，并导致难以预料的后果。在全球性经济衰退的形势下，过多的卖家将会追逐过少的买家。一个合情合理的假设就是务实的政客们将会尽力保护自己的选民免受全球性供过于求的侵袭。如果太多的国家这样做，全球化将可能会从内部瓦解。
这是一种可怕的前景。经济上的相互依赖利弊兼而有之。在有利情况下，它使各方受惠，在不利情况下，对各方都构成伤害。全球化的光明前景也许会超越它的危险性——但这种危险性真实存在。利弊都在等待新世纪的到来。到底哪一方会胜出，将会是新世纪极富戏剧性的重要事件之一。
Key Words:
sword [sɔ:d]
n. 剑，刀
instability [.instə'biliti]
n. 不安定，不稳定（性）
vehicle ['vi:ikl]
n. 车辆，交通工具，手段，工具，传播媒介
daunting ['dɔ:ntiŋ]
adj. 令人畏惧的
controversial [.kɔntrə'və:ʃəl]
adj. 引起争论的，有争议的
sovereignty ['sɔvrənti]
n. 主权，独立国
dual ['dju:əl]
adj. 双重的，成双的
n. 双数
control [kən'trəul]
n. 克制，控制，管制，操作装置
vt. 控制
expansion [iks'pænʃən]
n. 扩大，膨胀，扩充
champion ['tʃæmpjən]
n. 冠军，优胜者，拥护者，勇士
decade ['dekeid]
n. 十年
transportation [.trænspə'teiʃən]
n. 运输，运输系统，运输工具
critical ['kritikəl]
adj. 批评的，决定性的，危险的，挑剔的
unification [.ju:nifi'keiʃən]
n. 统一，一致
distinct [dis'tiŋkt]
adj. 独特的，不同的，明显的，清楚的
declining [di'klainiŋ]
adj. 下降的，衰落的 动词decline的现在分词
dwarf [dwɔ:f]
n. 矮子，侏儒
vt. 使矮小
commerce ['kɔmə:s]
n. 商业，贸易
global ['gləubəl]
adj. 全球性的，全世界的，球状的，全局的
inflation [in'fleiʃən]
n. 膨胀，通货膨胀
boom [bu:m]
n. 繁荣，低沉声，帆杠，水栅
vi. 急速增
presence ['prezns]
n. 出席，到场，存在
n. 仪态，风度
abreast [ə'brest]
adv. 并肩地，赶得上
stock [stɔk]
n. 存货，储备; 树干; 血统; 股份; 家畜
institute ['institju:t]
n. 学会，学院，协会
vt. 创立，开始，制
exceptional [ik'sepʃənl]
adj. 例外的，异常的，特别的，杰出的
achieve [ə'tʃi:v]
v. 完成，达到，实现
acquisition [.ækwi'ziʃən]
n. 获得，所获之物
maximize ['mæksimaiz]
v. 取 ... 最大值，最佳化，对 ... 极为重视
bond [bɔnd]
n. 债券，结合，粘结剂，粘合剂
compete [kəm'pi:t]
vi. 竞争，对抗，比赛
population [.pɔpju'leiʃən]
n. 人口 ，(全体)居民，人数
myth [miθ]
n. 神话
widespread ['waidspred]
adj. 分布(或散布)广的，普遍的
component [kəm'pəunənt]
n. 元件，组件，成份
adj. 组成的，构成
addition [ə'diʃən]
n. 增加，附加物，加法
organize ['ɔ:gənaiz]
v. 组织
relentless [ri'lentlis]
adj. 无情的，冷酷的，残酷的
recognition [.rekəg'niʃən]
n. 认出，承认，感知，知识
indicator ['indikeitə]
n. 指示器，指示剂
boom [bu:m]
n. 繁荣，低沉声，帆杠，水栅
vi. 急速增
limited ['limitid]
adj. 有限的，被限制的
动词limit的过
neutralize ['nju:trəl.aiz]
v. 使中立，使成中立地带，中和
optimism ['ɔptimizəm]
n. 乐观，乐观主义
prone [prəun]
adj. 俯卧的，易于 ... 的，有 ... 倾向的
vast [vɑ:st]
adj. 巨大的，广阔的
n. 浩瀚的太
population [.pɔpju'leiʃən]
n. 人口 ，(全体)居民，人数
inept [i'nept]
adj. 不适当的，无能的，笨拙的
funds
n. 基金；资金，现金（fund的复数） v. 提供资金
embrace [im'breis]
v. 拥抱，包含，包围，接受，信奉
prosperity [prɔs'periti]
n. 繁荣，兴旺
projected [prə'dʒektid]
adj. 投影的，投射 v. 投射（project的过去
relentless [ri'lentlis]
adj. 无情的，冷酷的，残酷的
measure ['meʒə]
n. 措施，办法，量度，尺寸
v. 测量，量
decline [di'klain]
n. 衰微，跌落; 晚年
v. 降低，婉谢
cooperation [kəu.ɔpə'reiʃən]
n. 合作，协作
global ['gləubəl]
adj. 全球性的，全世界的，球状的，全局的
stock [stɔk]
n. 存货，储备; 树干; 血统; 股份; 家畜
domestic [də'mestik]
adj. 国内的，家庭的，驯养的
n. 家仆，
dependent [di'pendənt]
adj. 依靠的，依赖的，从属的
global ['gləubəl]
adj. 全球性的，全世界的，球状的，全局的
accurately ['ækjuritli]
adj. 准确地
adv. 精确地，准确地
anxiety [æŋ'zaiəti]
n. 焦虑，担心，渴望
import [im'pɔ:t]
n. 进口，进口商品，意义
v. 进口，输入
opposition [.ɔpə'ziʃən]
n. 反对，敌对，在野党
competition [kɔmpi'tiʃən]
n. 比赛，竞争，竞赛
coherent [kəu'hiərənt]
adj. 合理的，一贯的，明了的，粘着的，相干的
exceed [ik'si:d]
vt. 超过，胜过，超出界限
vi. 领先
agenda [ə'dʒendə]
n. 议事日程
delay [di'lei]
v. 耽搁，推迟，延误
exceed [ik'si:d]
vt. 超过，胜过，超出界限
vi. 领先
logic ['lɔdʒik]
n. 逻辑，逻辑学，条理性，推理
interdependence [.intədi'pendəns]
n. 互相依赖
presumption [pri'zʌmpʃən]
n. 推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定
favorable ['feivərəbl]
adj. 有利的，赞许的，良好的，顺利的，偏袒的
inevitable [in'evitəbl]
adj. 不可避免的，必然(发生)的
global ['gləubəl]
adj. 全球性的，全世界的，球状的，全局的
discriminate [di'skrimineit]
vt. 区分，区别对待
vi. 辨别，差别对待
spontaneous [spɔn'teiniəs]
adj. 自发的，自然产生的
shield ['ʃi:ld]
n. 盾，防卫物，盾状物
参考资料：
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(1)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
- http://www.kekenet/daxue/201704/50630shtml
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(3)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(4)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(5)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(6)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
- 现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(7)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
现代大学英语精读(第2版)第三册:U9A Globalization's Dual Power(8)_大学教材听力 - 可可英语
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现代大学英语精读第二版（第三册）学习笔记（原文及全文翻译）——9A - Globalization‘s Dual Power（全球化的双重力量）
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