全球互联网排名_全球互联网的梦想已死

模式匹配 (Pattern Matching)

Welcome back to Pattern Matching, OneZero’s weekly newsletter that puts the week’s most compelling tech stories in context.

欢迎回到 OneZero 每周的时事通讯 Pattern Matching ， 它将本周最引人注目的技术故事作为背景。

“The dream behind the Web,” wrote the person who invented it, “is of a common information space in which we communicate by sharing information. Its universality is essential: the fact that a hypertext link can point to anything, be it personal, local or global, be it draft or highly polished.”

发明者写道：“网络背后的梦想是我们共享信息进行交流的公共信息空间。 它的普遍性是至关重要的：超文本链接可以指向任何东西，无论是个人的，本地的还是全球的，无论是草稿的还是高度修饰的。”

That was Tim Berners-Lee, writing in 1997, eight years after he proposed the idea that would become the World Wide Web. He went on: “There was a second part of the dream, too, dependent on the Web being so generally used that it became a realistic mirror (or in fact the primary embodiment) of the ways in which we work and play and socialize. That was that once the state of our interactions was on line, we could then use computers to help us analyse it, make sense of what we are doing, where we individually fit in, and how we can better work together.”

那是蒂姆·伯纳斯·李(Tim Berners-Lee) 在1997年提出的，当时他提出了成为互联网的想法八年。 他继续说道：“梦的第二部分也取决于网络的普遍使用，以至于它成为我们工作，娱乐和社交方式的现实写照(或者实际上是主要体现)。 那就是一旦我们的互动状态在线，我们就可以使用计算机来帮助我们进行分析，了解我们在做什么，我们各自适合的位置以及如何更好地一起工作。”

At the time, Berners-Lee felt that the first part of his dream — a common global information space — had been largely realized. The second part — that much of real life would move online, such that computers could analyze and reshape it — had “yet to happen,” he conceded, though there were “signs and plans that make us confident.”

当时，伯纳斯·李(Berners-Lee)感到他的梦想的第一步-一个通用的全球信息空间-已在很大程度上实现。 他承认，第二部分-现实生活中的大部分内容都会在线上移动，以便计算机可以分析和重塑它，尽管有“使我们充满信心的迹象和计划”，他还是承认“尚未发生”。

Today, we know that the second part of his dream was realized as well, though not necessarily in the ways he had hoped. Distinctions between real life and the internet have collapsed, especially since the pandemic, and as a result our interactions have become more trackable and analyzable. That tracking and analysis, however, has turned out to be more often a tool of manipulation, division, and exploitation than of cooperation for the greater good.

今天，我们知道他梦dream以求的第二部分也已实现，尽管不一定以他希望的方式实现。 现实生活与互联网之间的区分已经崩溃，尤其是自大流行以来，结果，我们的互动变得更加可追踪和可分析。 但是，事实证明，这种跟踪和分析通常是操纵，分裂和剥削的工具，而不是为了更大利益而进行合作的工具。

Meanwhile, the first part of Berners-Lee’s dream has quietly eroded even as the second has come to dark fruition. The open Web, as a universal venue for interaction, has been gradually supplanted by self-contained platforms controlled by giant corporations, like iOS, Android, Facebook, Amazon.

同时，伯纳斯·李的梦想的第一部分已悄然侵蚀，即使第二部分已成事实。 开放的Web作为交互的通用场所，已逐渐被由iOS，Android，Facebook，Amazon等大公司控制的自包含平台所取代。

While those platforms were never quite universal, until recently they offered roughly the same experience to users across much of the globe, with China and to a lesser extent Russia as glaring exceptions, among a few others. Now, even that semblance of common ground is rapidly fracturing, as nationalist political movements around the world begin to stake out their own digital territories and erect barriers to foreign platforms. For the first time, that includes the United States.

尽管这些平台从未普及过，但直到最近，它们仍为全球大部分地区的用户提供了大致相同的体验，其中以中国为例，在少数情况下则以俄罗斯为例外。 现在，随着全球民族主义政治运动开始放开自己的数字领土并为外国平台架设障碍，即使是这样的共同点也正在Swift破裂。 这是第一次，其中包括美国。

模式 (The Pattern)

Digital nationalism hits home.

数字民族主义风起云涌。

• The future of Chinese technology in the United States is uncertain after the Trump administration on Thursday issued a pair of executive orders targeting Chinese-owned apps. The first barred Americans or American companies from transacting with ByteDance, the Chinese parent company of the wildly popular video app TikTok. The second did the same for WeChat, the social app that’s dominant in China and important to Americans with ties to China, but has a much smaller English-language user base. The orders’ legality and enforceability are murky.

  在特朗普政府周四发布了一对针对中国拥有应用程序的行政命令后，中国在美国的技术前景不确定 。 第一批禁止美国人或美国公司与广受欢迎的视频应用程序TikTok的中国母公司ByteDance进行交易。 第二种方法对微信来说也一样。微信是在中国占主导地位的社交应用程序，对与中国有联系的美国人很重要，但英语用户群要小得多。 订单的合法性和可执行性不明确。

• The U.S. assault on Chinese tech is likely to broaden, barring some kind of diplomatic detente. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an expanded “Clean Network” plan to banish “untrusted” Chinese apps from U.S. app stores, among other measures. While TikTok and WeChat were the only ones mentioned by name, it would seem to imply that more are in the crosshairs. The plan would also bar U.S. app makers from pre-installing their apps on Chinese-made Huawei smartphones, and prohibit certain types of U.S. data from being stored on the clouds of Chinese companies such as Alibaba and Baidu. It builds on previous plans that focused on 5G networks, while the specific bans on ByteDance and WeChat echo the administration’s earlier Huawei ban.

  美国对中国科技的攻击可能会扩大 ，除非有某种外交手段。 周三，美国国务卿迈克·庞培(Mike Pompeo)宣布了一项扩大的“清洁网络”计划，以排除美国应用商店中“不受信任”的中国应用 ，以及其他措施。 虽然仅名字中提到了TikTok和WeChat，但这似乎暗示着十字准线还有更多。 该计划还将禁止美国应用程序制造商在中国制造的华为智能手机上预安装其应用程序，并禁止某些类型的美国数据存储在中国公司的云中，例如阿里巴巴和百度。 它建立在之前针对5G网络的计划的基础上，而针对ByteDance和微信的特定禁令与美国政府早前的华为禁令相呼应。

• Microsoft is still trying to buy TikTok, and now has a 45-day window to complete a deal, per the executive order. After initial rumors centered on TikTok’s operations in the United States and a few other English-speaking countries, the Financial Times reported Thursday that Microsoft is now interested in acquiring TikTok’s entire global business. (The app does not operate in mainland China, where ByteDance offers a similar app called Douyin that would remain in its control.) Early rumors put the price tag between $10 and $30 billion.

  微软仍在尝试收购TikTok ，并且根据执行命令，它有45天的时间来完成交易。 在最初的传言集中在TikTok在美国和其他几个英语国家的运营之后，《 金融时报》周四报道说，微软现在有兴趣收购TikTok的整个全球业务 。 (该应用程序无法在中国大陆运行，因为ByteDance提供了类似的名为Douyin的应用程序，该应用程序仍将在其控制范围内。)早期的谣言将其价格定在10到300亿美元之间 。

• The bans seem to be motivated more by politics than specific concerns about how these apps collect data. TikTok, for its part, said it was shocked by Trump’s order, given steps it had taken to address the administration’s stated concerns about the potential for Chinese surveillance of U.S. users. The underlying issue, to the extent that it’s genuine, would be that the Chinese government’s own laws give it broad grounds to compel Chinese companies to share data, opening the possibility that it could somehow use their products secretly as tools of propaganda or spycraft. The Trump administration has produced no evidence of Chinese spying via TikTok or WeChat, and TikTok insists it doesn’t store U.S. user data on Chinese servers. Several U.S. lawsuits allege otherwise. The Wall Street Journal had a plain-language primer earlier last month on TikTok’s data and security practices.

  这项禁令似乎更多是出于政治动机，而不是出于对这些应用程序如何收集数据的特殊担忧。 TikTok表示，鉴于已采取措施解决政府对中国监视美国用户潜力的担忧，TikTok对特朗普的命令感到震惊 。 就其真实性而言，潜在的问题是中国政府自己的法律为其提供了广阔的基础，以迫使中国公司共享数据，从而打开了以某种方式秘密使用其产品作为宣传或间谍工具的可能性。 特朗普政府没有提供任何通过TikTok或微信进行中国间谍活动的证据，TikTok坚称不会在中国服务器上存储美国用户数据。 美国的几项诉讼都另有说法 。 《 华尔街日报》上个月初对TikTok的数据和安全实践做了通俗易懂的入门文章。

• The U.S. crackdown on Chinese tech marks a new chapter in the history of the internet. For decades the United States has exemplified a laissez-faire approach to tech regulation and encouraged countries around the world to follow suit. It decried China’s “Great Firewall” as a barrier to trade and a tool of censorship and repression. It has given its internet giants broad leeway to amass market power and user data even as the European Union tried to rein them in. Now, under Trump, the United States is taking an approach previously associated with authoritarian regimes by banning foreign apps wholesale on thinly justified national security grounds. No longer do China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea look like exceptions to a global norm of borderless tech and free information flow.

  美国对中国科技的镇压标志着互联网历史的新篇章 。 几十年来，美国一直是放任技术监管的典范，并鼓励世界各国效仿。 它谴责中国的“防火墙”作为贸易壁垒和审查和压制的工具。 即使在欧盟试图控制互联网巨头的情况下，它也给了互联网巨头以巨大的腾出空间来积累市场力量和用户数据。现在，在特朗普的领导下，美国正在采取一种以前与威权政权有关的方法，禁止在国外批发薄薄的外国应用程序有理由的国家安全理由。 中国，俄罗斯，伊朗和朝鲜不再像无国界技术和自由信息流通的全球规范的例外。

• That seismic shift will reverberate as other countries follow suit. While some may target Chinese tech, others will likely take aim at U.S. giants such as Google and Facebook, using the companies’ sketchy privacy practices or ties to America’s own surveillance apparati as an excuse to restrict online speech. In a working paper published online this week, Stanford Law Professor Mark Lemley makes the case that the Splinternet is upon us. “It extends beyond software; we are increasingly building different hardware networks, and may ultimately end up with entirely separate internets,” he writes. Lemley makes clear that he views this as a bad thing, though his analysis is worth reading even if you disagree. For a more optimistic view of the trend, this thread by Basecamp’s David Heinemeier Hansson is a provocative starting point.

  随着其他国家的效仿， 这种地震变化将回荡 。 尽管有些公司可能瞄准中国技术，但其他公司可能会瞄准谷歌和Facebook等美国巨头，利用这些公司粗略的隐私惯例或与美国自己的监控设备的联系作为限制在线言论的借口。 斯坦福大学法学教授马克·莱姆利(Mark Lemley)在本周在线发表的一篇工作论文中，证明了Splinternet在我们身边 。 “它不仅限于软件； 我们越来越多地建立不同的硬件网络，最终可能最终会得到完全独立的互联网。”他写道。 莱姆利明确表示，尽管您不同意他的分析也值得一读，但他认为这是一件坏事。 为了更乐观地看待这一趋势，Basecamp的David Heinemeier Hansson的这一观点是一个令人发指的起点 。

• The global trend toward government control of online platforms was already well underway outside the United States, of course. India in June banned 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, amid escalating tensions between the two countries. Nikhil Pahwa, the Indian journalist and digital rights activist who founded MediaNama, told me he views the ban as primarily a political act. (You can read his initial analysis of the U.S. crackdown on TIkTok here.) But he said it’s hard to argue against countries erecting such barriers when there are also legitimate security and privacy concerns. “I think there is a split that we’re accelerating toward,” he said. “Just like the Chinese internet and Russian internet, that are very distinct from the rest of the world, I think we’re going to see more of these blocs getting created, where jurisdictions are going to assert their sovereignty in the same manner the EU is doing when it comes to privacy.” Speaking of which…

  当然，在美国以外， 政府对在线平台进行控制的全球趋势已经很好地进行了。 由于两国之间的紧张局势加剧，印度在6月禁止了59种中国应用程序，其中包括TikTok 。 创立MediaNama的印度记者和数字权利活动人士Nikhil Pahwa告诉我，他认为该禁令主要是政治行为。 (您可以在此处阅读他对美国对TIkTok进行镇压的初步分析。)但是他说，当存在合法的安全和隐私问题时，很难与反对设立此类障碍的国家抗衡。 他说：“我认为我们正在加速分裂。” “就像中国互联网和俄罗斯互联网一样，它们与世界其他地区截然不同，我认为我们将会看到更多这样的集团被创造出来，在这些地区，司法管辖区将以与欧盟相同的方式来维护其主权。在隐私方面正在做的事情。” 说到…

• You may recall that in July, the EU dealt a major blow to U.S. tech companies when it struck down the “Privacy Shield” data protection agreement. The agreement had allowed companies to store data on European users on U.S. servers on certain conditions. Now that will become much more difficult. Just as the United States and India cited concerns of Chinese government surveillance, the EU’s ruling cited concerns of U.S. government surveillance. Again, the concerns are not unfounded, as Edward Snowden’s leaks made clear. Taken to their logical conclusion, however, these arguments could lead almost any country to take action against almost any other country’s technology.

  您可能还记得，7月， 欧盟 取消了“隐私保护”数据保护协议， 对美国科技公司造成了重大打击 。 该协议允许公司在特定条件下将欧洲用户的数据存储在美国服务器上。 现在，这将变得更加困难。 就像美国和印度提到对中国政府监视的担忧一样，欧盟的裁决也提到了对美国政府监视的担忧。 同样，正如爱德华·斯诺登(Edward Snowden)的泄密所表明的那样，担忧并非没有根据。 得出他们的逻辑结论，但是，这些论点可能导致几乎任何国家针对几乎任何其他国家的技术采取行动。

• Let’s rewind to the 1990s and the heady early days of the consumer internet. Berners-Lee wasn’t alone in his view that the web would transcend national boundaries. John Perry Barlow, the late founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and a cyberlibertarian visionary of the modern internet, wrote an influential Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace in 1996. “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind,” he wrote. “On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”

  让我们倒退到1990年代和消费者互联网的兴盛初期。 伯纳斯·李并不孤单，他认为网络将超越国界 。 电子前沿基金会的已故创始人和现代互联网的网络自由主义者约翰·佩里·巴洛(John Perry Barlow)于1996年发表了有影响力的《网络空间独立宣言》 。“工业世界的政府，您疲惫的肉体和钢铁巨人，我来了来自心智的新家网际空间”，他写道。 “代表未来，我请过去的你离开我们。 我们中间不欢迎您。 您在我们聚集的地方没有主权。”

• The rallying cry helped inspire the fledgling internet industry to fight back against, circumvent, and overwhelm efforts at regulation in the ensuing decades, especially in the United States. But as April Glaser pointed out in Slate upon his death in 2018, Barlow’s vision failed to account for the ways that giant corporations and malign private actors might control, manipulate, and exploit an ungoverned internet in ways every bit as harmful as governments. As those harms have become undeniable, they have helped to justify reassertions of state control over the online world — some in good faith, others less so.

  在接下来的几十年中，尤其是在美国，集会的呼声激发了刚起步的互联网行业反击，规避和压倒性的监管工作。 但是正如April Glaser在Slate于2018年去世时指出的那样 ， Barlow的愿景未能说明巨型公司和残酷的私人行为者可能以与政府一样有害的方式控制，操纵和利用不受管制的互联网的方式。 随着这些危害变得不可否认，它们帮助证明了重新确立对网络世界的国家控制的正当理由-有些是出于诚意，有些则并非如此。

• I argued in this newsletter three weeks ago that you’d be able to tell whether a TikTok ban was in good faith by whether it also addressed the national security concerns raised by America’s own social platforms. Trump’s executive orders don’t even mention those, and his assaults on U.S. tech companies revolve almost exclusively around perceived slights to himself and his supporters. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal reported on Friday that a U.S. government contractor embedded location-tracking software in apps used on hundreds of millions of phones around the world. Remind us again which country’s mobile software is supposed to be the surveillance threat?

  我在三周前的时事通讯中指出，通过禁止TikTok禁令是否还解决了美国自身社会平台引发的国家安全问题 ，您可以判断禁令是否属善意。 特朗普的行政命令甚至没有提及这些命令，他对美国科技公司的攻击几乎完全围绕着对他本人及其支持者的轻视。 同时，《 华尔街日报》上周五报道说 ， 一家美国政府承包商在全球数亿部手机使用的应用程序中嵌入了位置跟踪软件 。 再次提醒我们应该将哪个国家的移动软件作为监视威胁？

• Twenty-three years after Berners-Lee imagined a World Wide Web that would serve as a common information space, the global information space may be fracturing beyond repair. Twenty-four years after Barlow wrote that the governments of the industrial world have no sovereignty over cyberspace, the governments of the industrial world beg to differ. The internet is indeed resilient and adaptable, as they foresaw — but so are the multinational corporation and the nation-state. It’s now clear that, to the extent the internet represents real life, it eventually becomes subject to the same forces and power struggles that govern everything else. For better or worse, the dream of a truly global, open internet is dead.

  在伯纳斯·李(Berners-Lee)设想将万维网用作公共信息空间的第二十三年之后，全球信息空间可能正在破裂，无法修复。 在巴洛(Barlow)写道工业世界的政府对网络空间没有主权后的二十四年，工业世界的政府恳求有所不同。 正如他们所预见的那样，互联网确实具有弹性和适应性，但是跨国公司和民族国家也是如此。 现在很明显， 在一定程度上，互联网代表了现实生活，它最终会受到支配一切的同样的力量和权力斗争的影响。 不论好坏，真正的全球性开放互联网的梦想已死。

暗流 (Undercurrents)

Under-the-radar trends, stories, and random anecdotes worth your time

雷达下的趋势，故事和随机轶事值得您花费时间

• TikTok proved that a social app can transcend cultural barriers, tech veteran Eugene Wei argued in his blog Remains of the Day, even as it ran up against governmental ones. After all, it wouldn’t have drawn such scrutiny in the United States if it hadn’t been the first Chinese-owned app to crack the market in the first place. Wei’s in-depth post is a fascinating dive into TikTok’s history from a product standpoint, and shows how the same interest-based algorithm can transcend disparate cultural contexts. Related, and also worthwhile, is Eva Dou’s Washington Post piece on why a TikTok backlash was inevitable. And for a more critical look at TikTok’s cultural influence, read Jason Parham in Wired on the particular brand of “digital blackface” that the platform seems to foster, or Tatiana Walk-Morris’s February piece on the same problem for OneZero.

  技术资深人士尤金·魏(Eugene Wei)在博客《 今日之遗》中辩称， TikTok证明社交应用程序可以超越文化障碍 ，即使它与政府应用程序背道而驰。 毕竟，如果它不是第一家打入市场的中国人拥有的应用程序，它就不会在美国受到如此严格的审查。 Wei的深入文章从产品的角度着迷了TikTok的历史，并展示了相同的基于兴趣的算法如何超越不同的文化背景。 与此相关且值得一提的是，伊娃·杜(Eva Dou)在《 华盛顿邮报》上发表的一篇文章，阐述了为什么不可避免地会发生TikTok反弹 。 要更审慎地了解TikTok的文化影响力，请阅读《 连线 》中的 Jason Parham，阅读该平台似乎在培育的特定“数字黑脸”品牌 ，或阅读Tatiana Walk-Morris在2月发表的关于OneZero的同一问题的文章。

• Google’s smart speakers were secretly listening for smoke alarms and other “critical sounds” for some users who hadn’t signed up for any such service, the company admitted after a Reddit post exposed the practice. While the O.P. found it “pretty rad,” Google told Protocol’s Janko Roettgers that the feature — recently developed for its Nest Aware home-security subscription service — was accidentally enabled in a software update for some non-subscribers and has since been retracted. Google recently took a 6% state in the home security company ADT, and as Roettgers notes, this hints at how Google could use its Home speakers to gain an edge in that market. It is also, as the Guardian’s Alex Hern observed, a bit disconcerting to know that “Google Home can be silently updated to turn the mic on based on undisclosed auditory cues.” Cue the conspiracy theories, and while we’re on the topic…

  该公司在Reddit帖子中披露了这种做法，并承认， 谷歌的智能扬声器正在为一些尚未注册任何此类服务的用户秘密监听烟雾报警器和其他“关键声音”。 Google向OP 协议的Janko Roettgers表示，虽然OP认为它“相当不错”，但该功能(最近为其Nest Aware家庭安全订阅服务开发的功能)在某些非订阅者的软件更新中意外启用，此后已撤回。 谷歌最近在家庭安全公司ADT取得了6％的占有率，正如Roettgers指出的那样，这暗示了谷歌如何利用其家庭扬声器在该市场上获得优势。 正如《 卫报 》的亚历克斯·赫恩(Alex Hern)所观察到的那样 ，这也让我有些不安，因为他知道“可以根据未公开的听觉提示，对Google Home进行无声更新以打开麦克风。” 暗示阴谋论，而当我们讨论这个话题时……

• People who share misinformation and conspiracy theories actually do care about the truth, according to a report from the nonprofit First Draft. In fact, they’re hyper-concerned with truth — they just think it’s being hidden from them. The report highlights the different results surfaced by searching for “coronavirus facts,” which turns up official sites from authoritative sources, and “coronavirus truth,” which leads down conspiratorial rabbit holes. Understanding the different ways that people seek information, and the assumptions they bring to that search, is crucial to any effort to address the spread of misinformation online, the report concludes.

  根据非营利组织“ 初稿”(First Draft)的一份报告， 那些分享错误信息和阴谋理论的人实际上确实在乎真理 。 实际上，他们非常关注真理-他们只是认为事实对他们隐藏了。 该报告强调了通过搜索“冠状病毒事实”和“冠状病毒真相”可以发现的不同结果，“冠状病毒事实”可以从权威来源获得官方网站，而“冠状病毒真相”可以帮助阴谋家兔洞。 报告总结说，了解人们寻求信息的不同方式以及他们进行搜索的假设，对于解决网上错误信息的传播至关重要。

本周头条 (Headlines of the Week)

For Whom the Tok Ticks

对于谁的壁虱

— Ian Bogost, The Atlantic

— 大西洋的伊恩·波哥斯特(Ian Bogost)

Scientists rename human genes to stop Microsoft Excel from misreading them as dates

科学家重命名人类基因，以防止Microsoft Excel将其误读为日期

— James Vincent, The Verge

-詹姆斯·文森特， 《边缘》

New bill would prohibit the president from nuking a hurricane

新法案将禁止总统制造飓风

— Maddie Stone, Washington Post

— 华盛顿邮报的 Maddie Stone

Don’t push your slower friends down in an attempt to save yourself from a bear, advises National Parks Service

国家公园管理局建议不要为了让自己摆脱熊而压低你的慢朋友

— County 10 (Fremont County, Wy.)

- 郡10 (怀俄明州弗里蒙特县)

Thanks for reading Pattern Matching. Reach me with tips and feedback by responding to this post on the web, via Twitter direct message at @WillOremus, or by email at oremus@medium.

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